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Types of Capitalism in Latin
America
Les types de capitalisme en Amérique latine
Ilan Bizberg
1 The four countries which I discuss in this article went through similar paths until the
beginning of the 70’, but they have diverged since. My main argument is that this shows
that although one could have talked about Latin America in general during the time of
ISI, it is now impossible to find a unique model of development in this continent. I will
defend the idea that, in the same way as there are different types of capitalism in the
developed world, in this case we are not dealing with different trajectories that lead to
the same end, to one same economy, but that we are witnessing the development of
different types of capitalism in Latin America, although they may not yet be consolidated.
2 I follow the literature that considers the existence of a variety of capitalisms. While some
capitalist  regimes  are  more  liberal  and  based  on  the  market  (US),  others  are  more
coordinated by social actors (Germany, North Europe) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In others,
it is the State, which has a crucial role (France), and still in others, the conglomerates of
banks and industries are the ones, which play the main role (Japan and Korea) (Amable,
2005;  Boyer,  2005).The  literature  that  discusses  Latin  America  from this  perspective
considers that the principal element that defines the type of capitalism that exists in this
continent is the fact that the societies are heterogeneous and hierarchic (Schneider and
Soskice, 2009).  This perspective considers that in Latin America there exists a unique
type, the hierarchical one; that this characteristic defines the orientation of the economy,
the role of the State, the industrial relations and the welfare system that combine into a
unique variety that in many senses is a deficient variant of the liberal market economy as
defined by Hall and Soskice. Although I agree with the consideration that inequality and
hierarchy are central features in the case of the Latin American case, I want to prove,
nevertheless,  that  the  dimensions  that  define  different  types  of  capitalism  are  not
determined  by  this  characteristic,  but  that  they  combine  in  different  manners  and
configure varieties of capitalism within this great category. 
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3 We will formalize those determinants defined by the varieties of capitalism school and
that  of  the  regulation  school  in  three  different  dimensions:  the  way  in  which  the
countries integrate to the world economy: whether they do so based on their internal
market or the external market; the relation between the State and the economy: that
defines among other things the character with which a country integrates the world
economy, whether it  does so in a proactive,  defensive or merely passive manner1;  in
thethird place we will considerwhat the regulation school calls the rapport salarial, which
is  defined  by  the  political,  social  and  economic  relation  between  the  State,  the
entrepreneurs and the unions; which includes the industrial relations system and the
welfare regime2. 
4 In at least three countries in Latin America we have been able to see that the economic
structure and the socio-political conformation (the orientation of the economy, the role
of the State and the wage relation (rapport salarial:  comprising basically the industrial
relations system and the welfare regime) are complementary enough to be able to point
towards ideal types, although they might not be totally consolidated yet. We can identify
two types  of  capitalism where  the  State  has  a  significant  role.  In  the  first  one it  is
determinant, the State is central in orienting the economy towards the internal market
(which does not exclude that exports, especially of commodities, are significant), and in
orienting  an  active  integration  to  the  world  economy;  here  unions  and  business
organizations  are  strong,  exert  pressure  on  government  but  are  also  capable  of
coordinating their action; this may be called a State led/inward oriented capitalism (a
formalization  of  the  characteristics  of  the  Brazilian  economy).  There  is  a  capitalism
where the State has a subsidiary role, that of regulating and defending national capital,
implementing  counter-cyclical  measures;  here  social  actors  are  weak,  coordination
between unions and capital is almost nonexistent, and full of conflicts; here the industrial
relations system is dominated by flexibility, and the welfare system is residual, assistance
oriented,  this  may  be  called  a  State  regulated/externally  oriented  capitalism  (a
formalization of the characteristics of the Chilean economy). Another type of capitalism,
albeit a disarticulated one because the articulation of the productive structure occurs
externally, is the one in which the State intervention is weak, the coordination between
unions  and  capital  is  almost  nonexistent,  because  social  actors  are  also  weak,  the
industrial relations system is dominated by flexibility, and the welfare system is residual
and  assistance  oriented,  this  is  the  international  subcontracting  capitalism  (a
formalization  of  the  Mexican  economy).   After  the  enormous  crisis  of  2001-2002,
Argentina reoriented its economy towards the internal market in a manner very similar
to that of  Brazil,  it  is  nevertheless  not  at  all  certain that  it  can be called a  type of
capitalism because its sustainability is absolutely not assured as it depends on changing
political  situations.  We can identify an additional type of capitalism existing in Latin
America, the rentist type, following Boyer, it may not be considered as capitalist at all
because the  political  and  social  relations  do  not  lead  to  increased  investment,  or
innovation,  but  are  rather  almost  “purely”  redistributive;  the  political  and  social
relationships as well as the economic ones are defined by the existence of resources in the
hands  of  the  State  that  are  distributed  without  any  productive  goals;  this  type  of
capitalism exists in Venezuela and partly in Ecuador, and Bolivia; in fact many of the
Latin American countries share this characteristic to some extent, although it is not as
central as it is in these latter countries.
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The 1970’s, a time of divergence between similar
trajectories3
5 Before analyzing the static, synchronic relation between the dimensions defined above, I
will analyze the relationship between them diachronically. There is an ample literature
on path dependency that we accept, but we consider thatit has to be referred less to
institutions than to social actors and the coalitions they have built, in this case to the
industrializing coalitions of the four countries we are analyzing in this article. Although
most  of  the  literature  on  Latin  America  considers  that  all  these  countries  followed
practically the same mode of industrialization by import substitution, that they had the
same  problems  and  failed  for  more  or  less  the  same  reasons,  there  were  crucial
differences between the countries. As analyzed in a path-breaking article by Marques-
Pereira  and  Théret  (2004),  Mexico  and  Brazil  followed  a  similar  path  of  economic
development  based  on  very  different  socio-political  conformations,  until  they  began
determining the economic evolution and started to function in non-complementary ways
in Mexico, and in more complementary forms in Brazil. In effect, when Latin America
faced one of its recurrent balance of payments crises in the seventies, these two countries
started to diverge in important ways. Brazil, governed by the military, which based their
legitimacy on continuous economic growth, faced the crisis directly and adopted import
substitution  of  intermediary  and  capital  goods  in  order  to  reduce  its  external
dependence, while it began opening its political system to solve its legitimacy problems.
Mexico’s fate was to find vast oil reserves tobecome an important exporter. This fact
together with the huge amounts of external credit the Mexican government acquired,
allowed the governments of the PRI to delay the transformation of its import substitution
scheme, and uphold their inclusive authoritarian political regime throughout the 70’s
(Marques-Pereira-Théret, 2004).
6 Even  though  during  this  decade  the  Mexican  State  also  invested  and  promoted
investment  in  steel  and  heavy  industry,  such  as  railcars  and  machinery,  Mexico
discovered huge reserves of oil that made it possible to opt for the “easy way”. There was
also a political rationale for this decision. Mexico arrived to the seventies under the PRI
regime,  a  civilian-authoritarian  regime  that  depended  on  its  control  of  the  popular
organizations  and  its  revolutionary  legitimacy.  It  was  an  inclusionary-authoritarian-
corporatist regime in contrast to the military exclusionary regimes of the South Cone.
Due to the challenge posed by the student movement in the late 60’s  and the labor
movement in the early seventies, the regime was more concerned with political stability
than with the viability of the economic system (Bizberg, I,  2004). The discovery of oil
reserves and the possibility of  acquiring debt seemed to be a perfect solution to the
dilemma of how to deepen the import substitution model while continuing to redistribute
and give concessions to its protected entrepreneurs. Although the Mexican State tried to
do both, it basically ended up doing the latter while expanding its oil exporting platform
and its debt. 
7 The 1982 crisis put the industrial bases of the Latin American countries again at stake. In
the case of Mexico, it disclosed the weakness of the industrial base, and the fragility of a
redistributive mode based on oil exports and debt. When in 1981 oil prices plunged and
the interest rates soared, Mexico suspended payments on its debt and had to recur to the
IMF that imposed draconian measures. The financial catastrophe and the recipes of the
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international  financial  institution  convinced  many  of  the  Mexican  leaders  that  the
country had to abandon import substitution and orient its economy towards the external
market. In the span of one sexenio, Mexico radically opened its economy and abandoned
its industrial policy with practically no social or political opposition. The new export led
growth model promoted an exceptional expansion of the maquiladora industry, and the
assimilation  of  other  exporting  industries  to  subcontracting,  once  the  government
abandoned the idea of enhancing the integration of local production to sectors dominated
by foreign capital, thinking that this would happen naturally without an industrial policy.
8 Brazil followed the contrary path. The economic scheme implemented by the military
was accelerated growth with no wealth distribution (Hermann,  2005a).  This  mode of
growth reached its limits at the beginning the eighties when the financial international
context reversed (Hermann, 2005b). At that moment Brazil had to depend on its own
resources in order to confront the disequilibrium created by economic growth under an
extremely unequal wealth distribution; the contrary of the fordist economic model that
existed in the US and Western Europe during the thirty years following the Second World
War.  This  situation eventually  led  to  a  rampant  hyperinflation,  as  the  redistributive
conflict could not be controlled in the context of a democratization process where social
forces were very active and had no intention of accepting to pay for the adjustment.
Although this situation was extremely costly in social terms, especially for the sectors
that  were  not  covered  by  indexation,  it  functioned  as  a  barrier  against  de-
industrialization caused by liberalizations under external pressure (Marques-Pereira and
Théret,  2004).  This meant that Brazil  could preserve its industrial  base and begin its
transit to democracy.
9  In  contrast  to  both  of  these  countries,  Chile  and  Argentina  abandoned  import
substitution, the first one in 1973 and the second one in 1978)(Canelo, 2009). The military
that ruled Chile,from 1973 to 1989, and Argentina, from 1976 to 1983, had as its main
purpose to extricate popular pressure from politics in order to “depoliticize” the State.
The  fact  that  the  labor  movement  in  both  countries  was  deeply  entrenched  in  the
political  system  explains  in  part  the  virulence  of  the  military,  as  well  as  the
predominance  of  political  over  economic  rationale4.  The  Argentinean  and  Chilean
military opened the economy, reduced the weight of the State, and limited redistribution.
Both countries had responded to the balance of payments crisis of the seventies with the
imposition of a new economic model (For Argentina: Rapoport, M. 2005, pp. 600-701, for
Chile:  Ffrench  Davis,  2008,  and  Silva,  2007).  In  both  Chile  and  Argentina,  harsh
dictatorship extended the liberal  economic agenda by crushing the trade unions,and
imprisoning or killing even the more moderate trade union and political leaders. 
10 A common feature of the various economic systems in Latin America was a strong state
intervention during the period of import substitution. Mexico and Brazil are probably the
two Latin-American countries where the state intervened most in the economy. There
were nevertheless  crucial  differences  between both interventions.  The Mexican State
emerged from a revolution, a fact that led to the establishment of a strong, centralized
state both economically and politically. The fact that the Mexican State emerged from a
violent  revolution  that  lasted  seven  years  implied  that  the  main  task  for  the  new
government was to preserve social and political stability.  When the Mexican political
system stabilized in the 1930s it did so on the basis of a national-popular alliance built
upon the  working-class  and peasant  organizations.  It  thus  gave  more  importance  to
redistribution for purposes of political control than to economic growth, until the end of
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the seventies. This fact implied that although thegrowth of the economy was central as a
source of legitimacy, redistribution in the context of its national-popular pact was still
more significant, and complementary to its revolutionary legitimacy (Bizberg, 2004). 
11 In  Brazil,  with  the  seizure  of  power  by  Vargas  in  1930,  but  especially  withthe
establishment of the Estado Novo in 1937, the state became a modernizing actor of society
and the economy. On the other hand, Brazil  experienced continuous regime changes:
after Vargas’s authoritarian regime, it transited to a democratic one between 1944 and
1964, then to a military regime from 1964 to 1985, and again to a democracy since then.
Each  new regime  had  to  legitimize  itself  and  economic  growth  was  crucial  for  this
purpose. Thus, while between the thirties and theend of the seventies, the Mexican State
had political stability and redistributionas its main issues it was concerned with price
control and witha stable exchange rate, being in consequence monetarist with regards to
its  economic  policies;  in  contrast,  the  Brazilian  state’s  main  concern  was  economic
growth,even at the expense of inflation and devaluation,and   its economic policy was
more structuralist (Marques-Pereira and Théret, 2004).
12 Because the Mexican State set as its priority distribution rather than economic growth
during the seventies, its economic structure and its dependence on oil and debt were
stronger, and its situation in 1982 was so fragile that it led it to abandon its role as an
actor of development much more radically than did the Brazilian State. On the contrary,
Brazil preserved its state action capacity, partly because the military that took power in
1964 had no plans to dismantle it, due to their will to become a regional power. 
13 The  Argentine  military  (1976-1983)  sought  to  destroy  unionism, considering  that  it
exerted too much pressure on the State. But unlike their fellow Chilean military they
never had the necessary strength to achieve their purpose. The fact that they were not
able to reduce the pressure of the unions prevented them not only fromconsolidating
their political regime, but also from implementing the liberal measures as radically as the
government of Pinochet did. It was only under the two peronista governments of Menem
that Argentina experienced massive privatization, and the policies of the Washington
Consensus (Boschi and Gaitan, 2008).
 
The Synchronic Analysis
Articulation to the world economy
14 Both  Mexico  and  Chile  share  the  external  orientation  of  their  economies,
notwithstanding that Brazil and Argentina are exporting more and more commodities
and industrial products, they are fundamentally oriented towards the internal market.
Data concerning the weight of exports in both groups of countries confirms this: while in
Brazil and Argentina and Chile the aggregate demand is balanced between the external
and  the  internal  market,  in  the  case  of  Mexico  the  external  market  is  much  more
significant. The impact of exports on the growth of GDP in Mexico was 58% between 2000
and 2008, and 67% in the previous decade (1990-2000), for Chile the percentages are 48%
and 39%, respectively. In contrast, for Brazil and Argentina the numbers are 27% and 29%
respectively between 2000 and 2008. In fact, for this same period, the net effect of the
external exchange on the internal demand (exports minus imports) of Mexico is very
negative, -18%, much more negative in the case of Chile -52.1, while in Brazil it is negative
in a  much lesser  proportion:  -6%,  and in Argentina it  is  slightly  positive:  0.6%.  It  is
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important  to  mention that  while  the  situation of  both Mexico  and Chile  aggravated
during the first  decade of  the new century with respect  to the previous decade,  the
situation of Brazil and Argentina bettered between both periods. In the nineties the net
effect  of  external  exchange on growth in Mexico was -4.4%;  in Chile -0.8%,  in Brazil
-13.7%,and -11.8% in Argentina. This is proof of the shift of both Brazil and Argentina
towards an activation of the internal market since the beginning of this century, which I
am defending in this article (Data from Bensusán and Moreno Brid, 2011).
15 On the other hand, although Mexico and Chile share the fact that the growth of their
economies depends strongly on exports and can be said to be externally led, they export
different types of products.While Mexico exports manufactured goods for more than 70%,
Chile exports primary and manufactured goods based on commodities nearing 90% (data
for 2008 from CEPAL, División de Comercio Internacional e Integración). Nevertheless,
there is one crucial characteristic of the Mexican economy, we have seen an impressive
growth  of  exports:  from 30,  691  million  dollars  in  1988  to  200,000  million  in  2011.
Nevertheless, the country’s imports increased at the same rate: they went from 28.082 to
196.967 million dollars per year from 1988 to the first semester of 2011. These data show a
disconnectbetween the exporting platform and the internal production,  an extremely
poor integration of national production to the export sector which explains the poor
growth of the Mexican economy. In fact, the connection of the Mexican exporting base is
in the external  market,  basically the United States;  which justify that we qualify the
Mexican economy as one of  international  subcontracting (Palma,  2005,  Dussel  Peters,
2006, Ibarra, 2008, Puyana y Romero, 2009).
16 Although Brazil and Argentina base their economy on the internal market, they are both
important exporters of primary goods. Up to 60% of Brazilian exports are primary or
manufactured goods based on commodities, while in Argentina the proportion is almost
70% (data for 2008 from CEPAL, División de Comercio Internacional e Integración).
17 These differences are complemented by distinctions that pertain to the character of the
integration to the international economy, where the singularities of Brazil,  Chile and
Mexico appear clearly. This character is highly related to the characteristic of the State
we  have  previously  discussed.  In  the  case  of  Brazil  and  Argentina  (since  2003),  the
autonomy of the State, State intervention has defined that the integration of this country
to the international  economy is  proactive;  this  has meant  active intervention in the
foreign exchange market in order to maintain a competitive exchange rate (Langellier,
2010). In contrast, in the case of Mexico the government has rarely intervened in the
exchange rate market, only when the peso suffers an important devaluation, the central
bank intervenes selling dollars; this has signified the overvaluation of the Mexican peso
in most of the last two decades. Although the Chilean State does not intervene in the
economy, it regulates its external economic relations quite efficiently, intervening in the
foreign exchange market when it is necessary. During the nineties and until mid-2000 the
Chilean State imposed a control (encaje) on foreign portfolio investments that limited its
unpredictability.  Finally, the Chilean State is set in diversifying its external markets by
signing free trade agreements with a great number of countries. Although Mexico has
also signed a great number of such agreements its diversification has been negligible, the
concentration and dependence on the US market is very great; 85% of its exports go to
this country. On the other hand, while the Brazilian, Argentinian, and Chilean States have
intervened,and have mechanisms to intervene in a countercyclical manner during the
economic crises, the Mexican government has limited its interventions to the maximum
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(Bizberg,  2011).  Finally,  while  the  States  of  Brazil  and  Argentina  impose  certain
restrictions to imports at certain moments, most recently to car imports from Mexico;
neither the Mexican nor the Chilean governments do so.
18 All these characteristics let us consider that while Mexico has a dependent or passive
integration to the world market, which is complementary to its dependence on foreign
investment in a regional and disarticulated logic:  that of subcontracting; Brazil  has a
proactive or offensive logic of integration, which Argentina has adopted since 2003; while
Chile’s  State  has  a  defensive stance to  foreign capital  and to the fluctuations of  the
international  economy,  although it  is  very liberal  and laissez faire  in what  concerns
productive investment (See Table 1).
 
State intervention
19 From  the  1970s  to  the  mid-80s  there  was  a  reversal  of  State  intervention  in  most
countries. But just as there were significant differences in the characteristics of coalitions
and state intervention that sustained the model of import substitution and its deepening,
there were differences in the timing of reforms, and on the depth of the withdrawal of
state economic intervention. A crucial difference in this regard relates to the political
situation at the time the withdrawal of the State: authoritarian in Mexico and in Chile,
democratic in Brazil and Argentina.
20 Facing the 1982 crisis, the Mexican State opened the economy to productive as well as to
financial capital, privatized its enterprises, abandoned subsidies to industry and to the e
jidos,  decentralized education and health services and shifted its social policy towards
assistance (Barba, 2007 and Valencia Lomelí, 2008). It was able to do so without social or
political resistance as it had preserved the authoritarian structure of the regime; it had
succeeded in only liberalizing the electoral process while continuing to control popular
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organizations.   According  to  the  new  market  logic,  the  State  was  set  to  become  a
regulatory  instance,  nonetheless,  the  manner  in  which  it  proceeded  with  the
privatizations  of  its  enterprises  and the  way it  conceived the  retreat  from economy
weakened  its  regulatory  capacity  considerably.  This  is  why  the  Mexican  economic
structure is plagued by monopolies and oligopolies in several areas such as telephone,
banking, media, the cement industry, commercial distribution, etc. 
21 The case of Brazil, as I mentioned is very different, the economic structure of this country
made the State less fragile during the crisis and thus resisted better the internal and
external  pressures  to  liberalize.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  country
democratized before the implementation of neoliberal policies, resulted in social actors
that opposed them; among them the trade unions and the PT; both crucial actors in the
democratization  process.  The  presence  of  a  trade  union  movement  backed  by  a
disciplined political party (the Workers’ Party) and a very active civil society opposing
the  Washington  Consensus  were  crucial  for  this  purpose.  On  the  other  hand,  the
fragmented and decentralized political system of Brazil failed to build a political coalition
capable  of  implementing  a  radical  dismantling  of  the  interventionist  State.  In  this
manner, resistance and lack of cohesion in the implementation of neoliberal policies have
meant that Brazil was the country in Latin America where the State has best preserved its
powers in the neoliberal wave of the 1980s and 1990s. 
22 The  case  of  Chile  resembles  that  of  Argentina  until  the  beginning  of  the  eighties.
Nevertheless, after the economic crisis of 1983-84, the government abandoned the purely
monetarist approach that had dominated until that moment, and began to sustain an
economy based on the industrialization of  commodities (copper,  agro-industry -  fish,
wine, dried fruits-, wood pulp) with a considerable support of the State (Rodrik, 2010).
Forest products started to be subsidized under Pinochet, the government financed R&D
for the development of the wine industry, while the salmon industry owes much to the
support  of  Fundación  Chile, a  semi-public  venture  fund.  The  Pinochet  government
preserved the copper industry under control of the State (Gaitán and Boschi, 2009, 11).
Under the governments of the Concertación, in the 90’s, the State imposed controls on the
entry of capital, in order to reduce the instability of portfolio capital. It also constituted a
stabilization fund based on the resources obtained through copper exports, to be used in
an anti-cyclical manner in times of crisis. In this way, the Chilean State implemented
what some have characterized as an autonomous State with a cooperative relationship
with the private sector (Silva, 2007, 79).
23 It is without any doubt that it was the Argentinian government that proceeded more
radically to liberalize during the nineties. The Menem government achieved this with the
complicity  of  part  of  the  peronist unions,  as  the  CGT  divided  upon  the  question  of
accepting the measures of Menem in exchange of keeping the control of the obras sociales
(the health services); the dissidents from the CGT created the CTA, which reunited again
with the  CGT under  Kirchner.   This  allowed this  country  to  be  the  one in  whichthe
withdrawal of the State from the economy went furthest (Boschi and Gaitan, 2008). 
24 This  is  an  important  difference  between  Argentina  and  Chile;  while  the  military
preserved  the  ownership  of  copper  and  the  State  company  Codelco,  the  Argentinian
government privatized the oil company: YPF.  Contrary to Argentina, the Mexican state
retained some strategic sectors such as electricity and oil, and it has not privatized water
or postal services. The fact that the States in Mexico, Brazil and Chile have kept control of
strategic economic sectors is not only important in terms of their ability to regulate the
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economy, but equally for state funding, especially with regard to foreign currency5. While
in Brazil, Mexico and Chile, the state has the capacity to get foreign exchange from its
own exports Argentina does not. There are nevertheless important differences regarding
how each of these countries deal with these resources: while in the case of Mexico the
fact that PEMEX is mainly used as a source of revenue for the state budget, it is something
that partly explains its low capacity to raise taxes and the “rentist” character of the
Mexican  State.  The  resources  of  copper  in  the  case  of  Chile  are  partly  saved  in  a
stabilization  fund.  Brazil  found  oil  reserves  much  later  and  in  much  more  complex
extracting  conditions,  forcing  Petrobras to  become  a  very  dynamic  company,  with
financial "autarky".
25 There are also differences between the financial systems of these countries in terms both
of  State and national  ownership.  While Brazil  retained a higher proportion of  banks
under  state  and  national  control,  the  Argentinian  and  Mexican  processes  of
denationalization of banks of the 1990s were radical, amounting to 61%. Although Mexico
resisted mass privatization of banks until the crisis of 1994-95, thereafter national banks
were bought by foreign banks to a 85%.  In Brazil, the percentage of banks in foreign
hands is only 49% (Boschi and Gaitán, 2008). In addition, the Brazilian federal government
continues to have an instrument to promote development unparalleled in Latin America
and the world,  the BNDES.  In fact  the BNDES has  expanded its  operations  since the
beginning of the 2000s, it handles one fifth of all the finances of the Brazilian private
sector,  and  it  has  become  the  first  source  of  long  term  financing  (Santana,  2011;
Hochstetler and Montero, 2012). It is also a significant factor in making credit available
during the global crisis as part of an aggressive anti-cyclical policy. From 1999 to 2009 its
disbursements as percentage of GDP grew from 3% to an impressive 8.5%; although it has
been reduced to 5.5% by 2011 (Hochstetler and Montero, 2012). Nevertheless, although
the bank’s increased action was intended to convert it in the main actor of a renewed
industrial  policy  of  the  Brazilian  government  (about  half  of  its  investments  are
committed to industry), most of its loans are concentrated in a few large companies that
have  always  dominated  the  Brazilian  economy  and  to  which  the  largest  loan  are
allocated: Petrobras, Vale, Electrobras, etc.  (Hochstetler and Montero, 2012).
26 In  contrast  the  Argentinian  BANADES was  privatized  in  the  1980s,  and the  Mexican
development  banks  have  dramatically  reduced  their  intervention  and  limited  their
character.  The Mexican State kept six development banks,  the most important being
Bancomext and NacionalFinanciera (Nafin).  The latter was created in 1934,and it was the
most important Mexican bank of the ISI period. Measured in terms of assets, these two
are the largest banks in Latin America;  nonetheless their impact diminished, as their
functions have been radically restricted. Nafin has reduced its role since the 1982 crisis,
and intensified its withdrawal with the trade and financial opening of the 1990s. Credit
operations for productive investment of Nafin were reduced by 70% between 1996 and
2004. It gives little credit to businesses and its resources are basically used as warranties
for loans offered by commercial banks to small and medium enterprises. Nafin has also
focused on "factoraje": paying the bills owed by suppliers or clients to small and medium
enterprises in advance. Finally, it serves as an intermediary for the funds received by the
Mexican government and international organizations for different economic and social
programs (Manrique Campos, 2007, 111-113).
27 Moreover,  in  Argentina,  Mexico,  and  Chile,  the  governmental  expertise  which  was
consolidated during the years of public intervention in the economy was dismantled, and
Types of Capitalism in Latin America
Revue Interventions économiques, 49 | 2014
9
the liberal reforms have been implemented by governmental staff that did not have an
alternative  project  of  the  role  of  the  State  in  a  globalized  economy.  In  Mexico,  for
example, the so called technocrats expelled the functionaries of the period of import
substitution of all departments. In Argentina, the reforms were implemented through
presidential  decrees,  in  Mexico  and  Chile  by  authoritarian  governments,  without
counterweight from social organizations or a developmental bureaucracy. In the case of
Brazil,  gradualism and relatively  delayed reforms allowed it  to  preserve  the  core  of
technical and bureaucratic expertise, which was considerable, especially in the economic
Ministries and in the development Bank, the BNDES (Evans, 1995:61 and Sikkink, 1988).
Even  when  these  functionaries  were  converted  into  agents  of  privatization,  they
succeeded in protecting some of the institutions because they had a totalizing vision of
state action. They either promoted less radical reforms and privatizations, or advanced
with a more integrated perspective of what remained in the hands of the State and with
the country’s economic structure (Boschi and Gaitán, 2008).
28 Nonetheless,  the situation has changed dramatically in Argentina after the 2001-2002
crisis. The government of Kirchner (2003-2007), and then that of Fernandez (2007-2011) in
many respects have retraced the path; enhancing the intervention of the State in the
economy. It has adopted a policy of managing its exchange rate so that the peso does not
overvalue and reverse the limited process of re-industrialization that began after the
2001-2002 crisis, when the peso was strongly devalued, and the country was cut from
external  loans,  and  imports  were  drastically  reduced  (Wylde,  2010).  The  State  has
imposed,  albeit  at  some moments in a very un-political  manner,  taxes on exports of
agricultural  products.  It  renationalized  the  pension  funds  that  were  based  on
capitalization, and re-established the pay as you go system in 2008.
29 The tax pressure is one of the clearest and most eloquent indicators of the capacity of
intervention of the State on the economy. In figure 1 we can clearly see the difference
between two groups of countries: Brazil - Argentina and Mexico - Chile. The fact that the
taxing pressure of Chile has been increasing (5% in 20 years) while Mexico has stagnated
(and in fact reduced) is an indicator of a relative change in the liberal paradigm that this
country has achieved, while Mexico hasn’t.
Types of Capitalism in Latin America
Revue Interventions économiques, 49 | 2014
10
 
Unions, industrial relations and welfare regimes
30 Industrial and labor relations and welfare policies are crucial to define the diversities of
capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Becker, 2011). In the more coherent types they are
complementary to the other dimensions (Boyer, 2005, Amable, 2005, Bizberg and Théret,
2011, Bizberg, 2011), and their features to a large extent determine their character. While
in  liberal  capitalism  a  residual  welfare  State  and  a  weak labor  organization  are
complementary to the manufacturing of  products  based on radical  innovation which
require flexibility of the labor market, in the Statist and corporatist-European capitalisms
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welfare and industrial relations are very extended, dependent on the labor situation of
the individuals and that of the specific economic sectors,  conditions complementary to
manufacturing based on incremental  innovation and high qualification.  In the social-
democratic capitalism, industrial relations are both centralized but flexible, while the
welfare regime is universal  and generous;  thus complementary to competiveness and
innovations based on solving social and economic problems. (Boyer, 2005, 529-32). What
is absolutely clear is that coordination between the State and labor as in Germany or
coordination between actors as in the social democratic countries of Northern Europe, as
well  as  a  more  generous  and  decommodifing  (Esping  Andersen,  1990)  welfare  State
depend on the strength of social actors, and in the first place labor. The strength and
autonomy of labor are crucial to understand both the character of the industrial relations
and of the welfare regime.
31 In the case of the countries of Latin America, labor and welfare policy either contribute to
the economic orientation led by the internal market through a wage led growth (Brazil
and Argentina) or merely compensate market faults in a market-oriented economy based
on foreign capital  (Mexico and Chile).  And,  in  return,  the situation of  labor  in  each
country is dependent on its relation with democratization and the implementation of
liberal measures in recent history. In the case of both Brazil and Argentina, what explains
the presence and strength of labor in both countries is the central role labor played in the
transitions to democracy in both countries, and the relation of the present governments
to labor:  the PT in the case of  Brazil  and the peronista government  of  Kirchner and
Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina.  In the case of Mexico and Chile, although labor was
significant  at  some  point  of  democratization,  it  was  effectively  demobilized  by  the
incumbent PRI governments in the case of Mexico in the late seventies, and of the Chilean
political opposition to the military government in the wake of the referendum they won
against Pinochet at the end of the eighties.
32 The  periodicity  of  the  political  and  the  economic  transition  was  also  of  central
importance. In the case of Brazil and Argentina, liberalization of the economy occurred
after democratization, which determined that it be less radical (although in the case of
Argentina it was radicalized during the peronista government of Menem with the support
of part of  the labor movement),and less offensive against labor organization and the
welfare regime. In the case of both Mexico and Chile, the liberalization of the economy,
and thus the flexibilisation of the industrial relations system, weakening of unions and
dismantling of the welfare State were accomplished without any resistance of the social
and  political  opposition  because  they  were  implemented  under  the  authoritarian
government; that is before the democratization process.
33 Mexico and Chile are the two countries where industrial relations have been deregulated
more radically. Negotiations in both countries occur at the local level, by enterprise, and
the labor movement is at present very atomized. In Chile unions were traditionally more
powerful at the political level, through the Socialist Party, and collective negotiations
took place at the branch level. In the labor law of 1979 what was achieved through harsh
repression  during  the  first  years  of  the  dictatorship  was  given  legal  form.  The  law
imposed the prohibition of political party involvement in union affairs, banned strikes
and shifted collective negotiations from the branch to the local-plant level. The law also
imposed very flexible industrial  relations;  where workers could be fired without any
reason and with a minimal compensation and where employers could substitute striking
workers.  Although  after  democratization  the  number  of  unions  has  increased
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considerably, they are smaller, and union rates are relatively low: 15.3% (Zapata, 1992 and
Barrera, 1994).
34  In the case of Mexico, the corporatist relationship that existed since the thirties has
almost completely disappeared. In contrast to Chile, where deregulation of the industrial
relations was achieved with the disappearance or murder of hundreds of union leaders
and a change in legislation, in Mexico it was accomplished under practically the same
law; in many cases by circumventing it.  During the eighties and nineties the internal
relations of the enterprises were radically flexibilized; while in the past, contracting a
worker was achieved through the union; at the present time it is rather the employers
who have this  right,  mostly  without  any negotiation.  The changes in the productive
process  and  the  organization  of  labor  are  now  decided  almost  exclusively  by  the
employers.  While some of the workers in the most strategic and dynamic sectors (oil,
education, health, telephone, automobile) still have the protection of unions, in the vast
majority  of  the workplaces  (maquiladora industries,  construction,  commerce,  services,
small and medium enterprises, the spare part auto-industry) there are no unions or they
only  exist  on  paper  (called  protection unions).  The fact  that  the  legislation has  not
changed in Mexico has been a constant complaint on the part of the business sector that
fearsa change of the conditions if a leftist party comes into power. Nevertheless, this
situation  has  allowed  the  technocratic  PRI  and  panista governments  (since  2000)  to
continue imposing State control over unions through a series of mechanisms: negotiation
with the traditional unions that continue being “loyal” to government in exchange of
privileges, the faculty of the Ministry of Labor to register unions, declare strikes legal or
illegal, and set salaries, as well as the approval of direct control of the unions by the
employers through “protection” unions.  The continued control of the labor unions by
way  of  the  instruments  (but  devoid  of  the  corporatist  relation  of  exchange)  of  the
corporatist arrangement was totally functional to this purpose (Bensusan, 2008). In fact,
Mexico’s union density descended from around 20% in the seventies to 10.3 % in 2002
(Lawrence and Ishikawa, 2005, 157). 
35 In Argentina, because trade unionism was more social as it controlled the health and
pension benefits,  and negotiated the general conditions of the workers at the branch
level, and was less rooted in the particular plants, flexibility was implemented without
much legislative change. In the 1990s, the Menem government tried to impose local level
negotiations,and wage increases linked to growth in productivity by decree. He also tried
to “privatize” health services, the so called Obras sociales administered by the unions.
Although flexibility passed, neither negotiations at the local level nor privatization of the
health  service  went  too  far,  partly  due  to  negotiations  between  the  main  union
confederation, the peronista CGT, that accepted flexibility (and other measures such as
privatization of public enterprises) in exchange for preserving their control of the Obras
Sociales.  The unions were successful in resisting both the intent to decentralize union
negotiations and to remove the obras sociales from the unions (Munck, 2004, 11). The fact
that the Menem government had to negotiate with the unions paradoxically led to a very
radical privatization program but concurrently to the preservation of the force of the
unions, that have been re-activated in the present Kirchner and Fernandez governments
(Etchemendy  and  Collier,  2007);  in  comparative  terms  the  Argentinian  labor
organizations have been relatively well preserved, at around 37% of union density, the
highest  in  Latin  America.   Nevertheless,  the  support  given by  unions  to  the  Menem
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government  did result  in  the division of  the peronista union,and ina decrease of  the
proportion of the active working class that it organizes (Palomino, 2000).  
36 With the arrival to the presidency of Nestor Kirchner in 2003, social and labor policies
changed  radically  with  respect  to  the  Menem  and  Alfonsín  years.  The  Argentinian
government reaffirmed its alliance with the peronist unions, it named a renowned labor
lawyer at the head of the Ministry of labor, that contrary to what was current during the
Menem  years  began  promoting  branch  level  industrial  negotiations  rather  than  by
enterprise (Palomino and Trajtemberg, 2006, 49). In addition, union action and increased
inspection by the Ministry of Labor led to a substantial increase of registered labor in
contrast to the previous tendency to subcontracting and informalization; the coverage of
collective bargaining went from 1.6 million workers in 2003 to 3.5 million in 2006. The
government also raised minimum salaries, worked to reduce the gap between low and
high salaries,and increased the resources of the pension funds; all these measures were a
result of higher salaries, and of a larger extension of coverage (Ibid. 52-5). According to
some analysts, since the year 2003, and again with measures such as the renationalization
of the pension funds in 2008 in the midst of the more recent crisis, there occurred a
turning point where the ancient socio-economic mode based on the external market,
labor  flexibilization  and  welfare  system  privatization  was  abandoned,  in  favor  of  a
development mode that pretends to equilibrate the external and the internal market, and
that articulates economic and social  policies in order to develop the internal  market
(Novick, Lengyel, Sarabia, 2009, 272). 
37 Although, as in the rest of the continent, industrial relations have been flexibilized in
Brazil, unionism has managed to retain an important degree of autonomy and capacity of
action. This is partly due to the fact that the labor movement in Brazil was both a central
actor in the democratization process,and in the discussions leading to the writing of the
1988 Constitution, but also because it never lost its character as an interlocutor with the
successive  governments,  even  with  the  more  liberal  ones.  During  the  presidency  of
Cardoso,  the  government  promoted  negotiations  between  employers  and  labor  (the
tripartite Cámaras sectoriais) in order to set conditions for the modernization and increase
production in several branches of the economy. More recently, under the presidency of
the PT with Lula, a party with ample trade union bases, the government has implemented
a number of negotiating institutions: labor participated in the negotiations of the labor
law,  and  in  the  tripartite  Social-Economic  Council.  Since  the  eighties,  unions  have
managed  to  impose  local  representation,  through  delegates,  in  some  of  the  largest
companies. They also managed to unionize previously non-organized sectors such as the
peasants (Bizberg, 2004). In fact, although it is true that unions are smaller, the total
number  of  unions  has  increased  considerably;  trade  union  density  is  quite  high  in
comparison with that of the rest of Latin America, 17.3% in 2001 (Lawrence and Ishikawa,
2005, 157).
38 What is crucial in this discussion regarding labor policy is that in Brazil and Argentina
there is a relative coordination/pressure on the part of an active labor union movement
that is  complementary to an internal market oriented economy, while in the case of
Mexico and Chile labor weakness, low union density, and atomization are complementary
to  an  economy based  on  external  competitiveness.  In  the  case  of  Chile  this  implies
decentralized negotiations that insure wage increases by enterprise that depend on local
conditions and that do not go beyond productivity (Miotti, Quenan and Torija, 2012): in
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Mexico this implies an economy based on wage repression in order to attract foreign
capital in a subcontracting scheme. 
39  This can be clearly seen in the contrasting manner in which real minimum salary has
been evolving in each of these countries (Figure 2). During the last four years there has
been a significant increase of minimum salaries in Brazil and Argentina that not only
served to close the gap between the best and worst paid workers and reduces inequality,
but as an economic policy tending to expand the internal market. One has to consider
that minimum wage increases impact pensions, unemployment benefits, contributions,
etc., as many of these are calculated on this basis. In February 2009 the minimum salary
in Brazil almost doubled that of 2000 in constant terms (ILO, 2009). In contrast, in both
Chile and Mexico minimum salaries have been held under control, with the important
difference that in Chile they are constantly above inflation, while in Mexico in many
years there has been a loss of purchasing power.
40 Two other components of  industrial  relations that affect  the internal  market growth
areinspection and collective negotiations; both have an impact on the formalization of
the labor market,  and on the level of wages.  Whereas in Mexico no advances in this
respect are noticeable, both the informalization and “protection” unions that do not hold
collective  negotiations  have  been growing,  and the  effect  on salaries  (minimum and
average) has been negative.  Chile has been a success in formalization of workers; the
informal sector had been reduced to around 22% (whereas informality in the three other
countries is around 45%) as a result of economic growth and work inspection, rather than
collective bargaining (Quenan and Velut, 2011: 52). Nevertheless, some authors consider
that lowering the informal sector in Chile has actually been achieved at the expense of
lowering  considerably  the conditions  of  formalization  (Bensusan,  2008).  In  the  cases
Brazil and Argentina (since 2004) there has been a very consistent effort in both respects,
which has  led to  a  significant  expansion of  formalization of  employment  (ILO, 2009,
Dedecca, 2010, Bensusan, 2010; see figure 4). 
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41 Welfare policy is  the result  of  a  social  contract  between labor and the State  and/or
employers,  which  has  a  short-term  impact  on  the  economy  through  pensions,
unemployment compensations, health investment and expenditure, and a medium and
long-term impact through productivity growth. Brazil and Argentina (since 2003) have
been expanding their  welfare  regime,  while  in  both Chile  and Mexico  it  has  shifted
towards assistance. 
42  In Chile the welfare regime has been most profoundly modified; in fact, we consider that
it is the only country that has actually dismantled the old system. Under Pinochet the
inclusive pension system was privatized; it was totally converted into a capitalization
scheme. The military also partly privatized health services and reoriented social policy
towards a focalized assistance scheme. The pension system passed from a “pay as you go”
to  an  individual  capitalization  scheme,  health  services  were  decentralized  to  the
municipal  level,  and workers started being obliged to pay for their health insurance.
Although the democratic  governments  accepted the economic  model  adopted by the
dictatorship,  as  it  constituted the  base  of  a  consensus  that  had permitted a  smooth
transition to democracy, they somewhat modified the labor relations system and adjusted
social  policies.  They nevertheless preserved the liberal  character of  both the welfare
regime  and  the  industrial  relations  system.  They  extended  health  coverage  and
established  safeguards  for  workers  who  did  not  accumulate  enough to  get  a  decent
pension. The Lagos government instituted a minimum salary pension for those workers
that did not arrive to this level through capitalization. On the other hand, as the private
ISAPRES only covered 16% of the population and did not provide treatment for many of
the diseases common to Chileans, the two last governments set up standards to include
them, and extended public health services to cover 70 % of the population (Mesa-Lago, C.,
2009, 13). In the year 2008 the government of Bachelet implemented a Welfare Reform
that included the compulsory affiliation to an independent workers health system by
20166,  and  the  universalization  of  a  non-contributive  pension  for  the  poor.  It  also
flexibilized access of the old to contributive pensions (Mesa-Lago, 2009, 15-6). Although
Chile has surely not abandoned its economic model oriented towards the external market
and its liberal character, where economic rationality primes over the social one, it has
certainly corrected the most unjust elements of the welfare reforms of the dictatorship
(Riesco, 2009).
43 Nevertheless,  this  coverage  of  the  majority  of  the  population  is  achieved  in  quite
paradoxical  conditions,  which  show  the  limits  of  the  reforms  of  the  democratic
governments. In fact, the public sector ends up subsidizing the private one: while the
private ISAPREs insure mainly the young and higher revenues individuals, 85% of the
insured in this system are between 15 and 59 years old, and only 3% are over 60, at the
public FONASA 54% of the insured are between 20 and 60 years old,and 18% over 60; this
obviously means that a significant percentage of those in the ISAPREs are expelled from
the system when they grow older and are more prone to be sick (Ministerio de Salud de
Chile, 2010: 172). In some cases individuals are so sick that they have to incur in such a
costly treatment they cannot afford the copayment in the private sector, so they are
obliged to migrate to the public one.
44 It is also necessary to mention that it has done almost nothing to improve the situation of
the educational system that led to the first social crisis encountered by the Bachelet
presidency,and that has literally exploded at present. Something comprehensible when
one notes that Chile spends only 0.5% of the PIB in education, one of the lowest in the
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world, and that university fees represent 41% of per capita GDP, one of the highest in the
world (Koschützke, 2012: 20).
45 The welfare regime in Mexico has been closely linked to the needs of the PRI; it was the
way in which the State exchanged benefits for control of the social organizations in a
corporatist  scheme.  Since  the  arrival  of  the  “technocrats”  to  government,and  the
distancing of the State from these organizations, the Welfare State has been evolving
towards a more universal, albeit minimalist scheme. Since the mid 90’s social programs
have decidedly shifted to assistance (Valencia Lomelí, 2008). The main social program
Oportunidades focalizes  on  the  poorest,  including  nowadays  5,800,000  families.  It  is
complemented by the Seguro Popular,  a decentralized health program run by the local
States, financed by them and by the federation. This program pretends to extend health
coverage to the whole of the population that is not insured by the traditional public
systems (IMSS and ISSSTE), but it has been incapable of inducing the great majority of the
informal workers that would have to contribute (an amount that varies according to their
resources) in order to affiliate. According to the OCDE, the Seguro Popular has enlarged
health  coverage  to  close  80%  of  the  population,  although,  expenditure  and  health
infrastructure have not been increased correspondingly (Bizberg and Martin, 2012). In
fact, according to the ECLAC, in the year 2000 there were 0.8 beds, and in 2010, 0.7 beds
per 1000 inhabitants; in Brazil there were 2.5 in 2005, in Argentina 2.1 in 2010, and in
Chile 2.3 (ECLAC, 2011). On the other hand, the percentage of health expenditure that has
to be financed by the patients themselves has been reduced rather marginally from 51.9%
to 49% (Reforma; 28/08/12: 2); in contrast to around 32% in Brazil (Becerril-Montekio,
2011).
46 During the first “technocratic” government (1988-1994), the resources for the assistance
programs  came  from  the  privatizations  of  the  State  enterprises.   Since  then  the
government has had to proceed to the dismantling of the corporatist welfare system in
order to finance them. It thus transformed the “pay as you go” pension system of the
private sector workers into an individual capitalization system in 1995, and that of the
public sector workers in 2007, copying a Chilean model that was already being questioned
in 1995.
47 Brazil and Argentina (since 2003) stand in sharp contrast to both of these cases in that the
welfare regime was not radically modified, especially the case of Brazil.  The fact that
labor has been a significant actor in this country,and that since the year 2003 the PT, a
party that has roots in the trade union movement, notably the CUT, has not only signified
that unions have been convened to discuss issues concerning labor and welfare policies,
but that their presence and pressure has obliged the government to extend social policy.
In fact, Brazil not only has not reduced its welfare regime but it has been advancing
towards universalization in the last decade. The Brazilian regime was centralized by the
military in 1967 in order to extort its control from the trade unions. In this way, the
welfare  regime  became  less  corporatist,  thus  relatively  more  universalistic,  albeit
minimalist and clientelistic. During the nineties, Brazil did not reduce spending in health
and education as most other countries in Latin America did (Lautier, B., 2007, 53). It did
not abandon the “pay as you go” pension system or even institute a mixed one. In fact,
the 1988 Constitution instituted through a process with an active participation of civic
organizations, defined as one of its main goals the universalization of the Welfare state,
something that has pressed the successive governments to expand social policies. This
was especially true in the case of health with the creation of the SUS (Sistema Unificado de
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Salud). This system, based on the model of the British National Health Service, extended
the offer of free health services very rapidly: in 2003,79% of the population was using
these health services regularly,and it financed 57% of the total health acts, 26% were at
least partially financed by private plans,  and 15% by the patient himself.  Concerning
hospitalization, the SUS financed 68% of the acts,and the private plans 24% (Lautier, 2007,
56-7).  The most important assistance program, Bolsa Familia, was expanded both in terms
of resources and coverage, and in 2009 reached almost 50 million people (Dowbor, L.,
2009, 194). In addition, non-contributive pensions to the rural workers were expanded:
since 1991,12.8 million people get a minimum salary. Another social assistance program,
called  the  BPC  (Beneficio  de  Prestação  Continuada),  covers  about  2.7  million  old  or
incapacitated individuals over 65 years which live in a home that has a revenue lower
than one fourth of  a minimum salary (Lautier,  2007,  60-2).  Finally,  Brazil  is  the first
important  country  in  the  world  to  have  instituted  (in  2004)  a  basic  revenue  of
 citizenship, called Renda Básica de Cidadania,that was supposed to cover all Brazilians by
2008 and substitute all other assistance programs and minimum pensions, but it has not
been implemented yet (Lautier, 2007, 54). 
48 In Argentina,  both Alfonsín and Menem failed to retrieve the obras  sociales from the
unions to concentrate them in the hands of the State. Although the Menem government
did succeed in imposing a private pillar to the pension system,and weakening the unions
with its  economic policies;  the unions managed to  preserve the control  of  the obras
sociales.  After the 2001 crisis, they regained force from their position as a crucial ally
(together with the unemployed piquetero organizations) of the new Kirchner government.
With the support of the peronist unions, this government implemented policies intended
to extend the coverage of health services through the obras sociales of the retired workers,
and reduced the population without health services, reaching a coverage of 59% (Mesa-
Lago, C., 2009, 15). Finally, in 2008 the Fernandez government renationalized the pension
funds  which  had  been  partially  privatized  during  the  Menem  presidency.  The
government unified the system under a State controlled solidary regime, eliminating the
segment  of  capitalization  administered  by  the  AFJP  (Administradoras  de  Fondos  de
Jubilaciones) (CEPAL, 2010, 8-9).
49 In Figure 3 we compare State expenditure in social programs. We can see how both Brazil
and Argentina are on a much higher level that Chile and Mexico. In addition, while in
Brazil social expenditure has been continuously growing since the 90’s, Mexico started
out at an extremely low level,and even if it has almost doubled its expenditure, it is still
half of that of Brazil. The effects of these policies are clear in Figure 4, where we can see
the different levels of social protection in the four countries. I have explained above the
paradoxes of the high coverage of the Chilean case.
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Concluding remarks: Is there a diversity of capitalisms
in Latin America?
50 We  have  constructed  three  types  of  capitalism in  Latin  America  on  the  basis  of  an
analytical formalization of the orientation of the economy, State-economy relations, and
the coordination/pressure of the labor movement as defined by the industrial relations
system, and the welfare State of the four countries we have analyzed in this article. In
terms of industrial relations and the welfare regime it is clear that Mexico and Chile have
great  similarities.  In  both  workers  organizations  are  weak,  there  is  no  coordination
between them and the State or the entrepreneurs; as result wage and labor policies are
decentralized and tend to be contained. In the case of Mexico this has resulted in outward
wage repression leading to low wages that benefit the subcontracting model, while in the
case of Chile wages are set in atomized contractual negotiations,and they end up being
closely linked to productivity.  The fact  that  the economy in Chile  has  been growing
almost continuously for the last twenty years, and that its productivity has increased
significantly,  has resulted in a  slow but  continuous growth of  salaries.  Mexico has a
restrictive  labor  policy  because  the  cost  of  labor  is  a  determinant  component  of  its
exports,and a crucial element attracting foreign investment in a subcontracting mode.
Chile is mostly concerned by the cost of the total product of its exports, which are mainly
commodities, with high capital content, something that can be regulated by an exchange
rate policy which depends on the regulation of the entry of foreign capital; an area where
Chilean governments have excelled since they imposed restrictions on the access of short
term capital in the 90’s and thebeginning of the 2000, and that is at present managed
through  the  administration  of  foreign  reserves  oriented  to  maintain  a  competitive
exchange rate. Mexico has a smaller margin in this respect: in the first place exchange
rate policies  are quite ineffectual  when exports  depend so highly on imports,  in the
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second  place  it  cannot  afford  to  control  foreign  investment  as  it  needs  it  both  to
equilibrate its trade deficit and to sustain a strong currency in order to attract fresh
investments, finally labor is very sensitive to exchange rate hikes.  The obvious counter
effects of this situation are that the maintaining of an overvalued local currency makes
imports cheaper, turns against local producers, and is responsible for the slow growth of
the Mexican economy (Ibarra, 2008).
51  In  addition  to  the  flexible  labor  policies  described  above,  a  liberal  social  policy  is
complementary to the capitalist modes of Mexico and Chile, as they both depend almost
totally  on  the  international  competitivity  of  their  economies.  In  both  countries  the
Welfare regime is almost purely focalized, assistance oriented,and led by market logic (in
Chile this logic is set to its limits as the State subsidizes a privatized social security and
health system); that totally excludes decommodification and redistribution. Policies on
wages, labor conditions,and social policy are considered almost exclusively as economic
costs,and they depend on a logic defined on the basis of the external competitiveness of
both the Chilean and the Mexican economy.
52 In contrast,  in Brazil  and Argentina,  union density is  medium to high;  labor is  quite
autonomous and has considerable power. This situation is due to their central role in the
process of democratization. Besides, the incumbent governments have either allied with
them or have chosen them as social partners(Brazil is governed by the PT since 2002 and
the Kirchner government in Argentina re-affirmed its alliance with the peronist CGT at the
wake of the grave economic and political crisis of 2001-2001). The strength of labor and
its  relation  to  government  in  these  countries  has  resulted  in  a  departure  from the
previous labor and assistance policies, and in a tendency to universalize the welfare State.
On the other hand, the expansive wage and social policies are complementary to the
orientation of the economy towards the internal market. 
53 The second characteristic which determines the different types of capitalism in Latin
America has to do with the presence of a relatively strong labor movement, and with the
coordination between unions and the State which in its turn has supported a stronger
State intervention in the economy. In contrast, in countries where social actors are weak,
the State is also weak; in a great measure this is the result of the fact that the State in
most Latin American countries was built upon the social actors, especially labor. While in
both Mexico and Chile the State has retreated from intervening in the economy, in Brazil
the State actively promotes certain productive activities through its development bank
(BNDES), and public policies. After the 2001-2002 crisis, Argentina shifted from a very
open economy and a non-intervening State to a model akin to that of Brazil. It is not clear
if this model will survive an eventual change of government as it has already happened in
Brazil  (from Cardoso to Lula) due to its dependence on the leadership of its two last
presidents in a very de-structured political system (Aziz, A., 2011). Although both State
intervention and coordination between the State and labor and the entrepreneurs are far
from what exists in the types of capitalism of some of the continental European countries,
they are both equally complementary with the general orientation of the economy and of
its mode of articulation to the international economy.
54 Finally, the fact that economies like those of Mexico and Chile are led by the external
market and accompanied by a retreat of the State while those of Brazil and Argentina are
led by the internal market and the active intervention of the State define the character of
the articulation of those economies to the international economy. Thus while in Brazil
and  Argentina  the  State  engages  policies  to  preserve  the  internal  market  from  the
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fluctuations  of  the  international  economy  by  temporarily  controlling  short  term-
portfolio investment, imposing transitory controls on imports, and trying to maintain the
exchange rate at a level that does not affect its industry (although they do not always
succeed),  in Mexico the State does not impose any of these limits,  both because it  is
contrary to the economic project of the succeeding governments since the mid 80’s and
because the rules of NAFTA prohibit them. In Mexico, the international (basically with the
United  States,  although  not  exclusively)  articulation  of  the  productive  basis  of  the
Mexican economy requires a labor policy that exerts a restrictive control on salaries, and
a social policy defined as a safety net; although there are sectors of the economy that
have high salaries, the dominant economic mode requires low salaries as it is based on
the attraction of foreign investments on productive branches with a high aggregate of
labor; thus salaries are more important as an element of competitiveness of an export
economy than as a component of the internal market. The only possibility of escaping
this situation would be vertical integration of the industry through the incorporation of
national providers to the export industry, something that the last four governments have
considered would happen spontaneously through the market. We have thus considered
that while Brazil (and Argentina) seems to be on a road to consolidate a capitalism that is
State oriented and led by the internal market, Mexico has constructed a disarticulated or
rather, externally articulated, international subcontracting capitalism.
55 Although Chile has been following a very similar path to that of Mexico in relation to the
external orientation of the economy and its labor and social policies, its State, in contrast,
has applied a number of different measures concerning its relation to the international
economy, though in a defensive rather that in a proactive manner. Although this country
has  followed  an  export  driven  mode  of  development  since  the  military  coup  it  has
diverted at some moments from the purely liberal market economies. During the mid-
eighties,  after the liberal-monetarist  model  collapsed,  the State began to increase its
intervention in the economy. Until the nineties, this economic mode was complemented
by  a  radical  liberal-residual  social  model  in  both  its  labor  and  its  welfare  policies,
epitomized by the total privatization of the pension system, the intent to privatize health
services and a very restrictive labor law. Although the democratic governments did not
modify the economic mode, they have adjusted the labor and social policies in order to
make them less unjust without modifying their liberal character. The Chilean democratic
governments  modified  the  liberal  welfare  policies  to  compensate  for  the  loopholes
created by the reforms of the eighties. On the other hand, the Chilean governments not
only have implemented a defensive policy towards the international economy, they have
also  at  some point  regulated  the  access  of  speculative  capital,  imposed  measures  to
maintain a competitive exchange,and built a reserve of foreign currency from copper
exports in order to implement counter-cyclical policies. Finally, the country has signed
numerous free trade agreements in order to diversify its exports and not depend on one
or a few countries. In contrast to Brazil which has a proactive policy and is trying to
impose its own mode of integration to the international economy, in contrast to the
Mexican mode of dependent and passive integration to the international economy and an
accrued dependence on one single market, Chile seems to be defending an integration of
its  economy  to  the  world  market  that  we  have  called  State  regulated  external  led
capitalism7. Finally both countries differ in size. Whereas a small country, of 17 million
inhabitants  can develop exclusively on the basis  of  exports  (like the small  European
countries),  a big country like Mexico,  with more that 110 million inhabitants,  simply
cannot, it is obliged to depend on its internal market for growth. Nonetheless, even Chile
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will  not  be  able  to  increase  wealth  considerably  and  redistribute  it  (as  the  social
democratic  European  countries  do)  if  it  does  not  add  value  to  what  it  exports  and
continues exporting natural resources with low value added.
56 In the case of Argentina, the 2001 devaluation generated a change in the relative prices of
its  manufacturing  sectors  that  together  with  the  increased  external  demand for  the
commodities it exports have sensibly eased the external foreign currency restrictions it
has traditionally faced and promoted import substitution. On the other hand, since 2003,
the Kirchner and Fernandez governments have effectively reoriented the social and labor
policies both in response to increased social pressure (the piqueteros and the peronista
labor unions) and to their will to stimulate re-industrialization. Although according to
some analysts these measureshave marked a significant transformation of the pattern
of  development,  Boyer  and  others  consider  that  Argentina  has  not  been  able  to
substantially modify its investment and productive structure, its mode of accumulation,
which continues to be based on natural resources (Fernandez Bugna and Porta, 2008, 223).
Thus, even though the last two governments have been decidedly trying to impose an
internal market led growth, Argentina is still struggling between two different capitalist
modes, as it has traditionally done. On the other hand, this fundamental polarisation in
Argentina and its translation into politics makes the sustainability of the actual economic
mode very dubious, it could thus be reversed anytime in the future as it has often done in
the past (Bizberg and Théret, 2012).
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NOTES
1.  This will  define one of the principal  differences between Mexico and Chile,  the defensive
character of the integration of the second against the passive one of the first; although in fact
they are very similar in terms of orientation of the economy and socio-political configuration.
2.  We are not able to include other relevant elements such as the educational and qualification
system nor the political system for lack of space.
3.  This section of the article draws abundantly from Bizberg, Ilan and Bruno Théret, 2012.
4.  While  the Brazilian military had the same purpose of  “depoliticizing” the State after  the
intense union mobilizations that had characterized the Goulart presidency they had overthrown,
the unions were not as deeply entrenched in the Brazilian political system as were the peronistas
in Argentina or the trade unions in the Socialist  Party of  Chile.  The political  and repressive
measures  they took were  less  radical,  so  were the economic  ones.  In  addition,  in  Brazil  the
military took over before the crisis of the 70’s, a moment where there was still no alternative
model  to  import  substitution,  or  when it  was  still  not  so  hegemonic  as  it  became since  the
eighties. The Brazilian military thus followed many of the structuralist economic policies that
had  been  in  vogue  in  this  country  although  they  considerably  reduced  redistribution,  and
especially took away the redistributive mechanisms from the unions.  On the other hand, the
military, as well as the civilians before and after them, had a conception of their country as a
regional  and  international  power  that  needed  a  strong  economic  basis,  which  meant  self-
sufficiency  in  heavy  industry,  machinery,  and arms (Sallum,  B.  2010).  This  led  the  Brazilian
military to deepen industrialization rather than to open the economy.
5.  This is one of the main reasons why the government of Cristina Kirchner nationalized the oil
company in 2012.
6.  In contrast, in Mexico the Seguro Popular is voluntary.
7.  The intervention of the State in the case of Chile has lead to important discrepancies. Most
authors consider that the State is basically absent in this country, nevertheless I consider, with
other authors, Rodrik, 2010, Miotti, E.L., C. Quenan and E. Torija, 2012 and Boyer, 2009  that the
State has a stronger presence in Chile that is generally acknowledged.
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ABSTRACTS
Although one could have certainly talked about Latin America as a whole during the time of ISI, it
is nowadays impossible to find a unique model of development in this continent. This article
defends the idea that just as we find a variety of capitalisms in the developed
countries, according to the varieties of capitalism and the French regulation
schools, in Latin America we are also witnessing the development of different
types of capitalism. In at least three countries in this continent we have been able to see that
the  economic  structure  and  the  socio-political  conformation:  the  articulation  to  the  world
economy, the role of the State,and the wage relation -rapport salarial- (comprising basically the
industrial  relations system and the welfare regime) are complementary enough to be able to
point towards ideal types, although they may not yet be consolidated.
On pouvait parler de l’Amérique latine dans son ensemble à l’époque de l’ISI; il est aujourd’hui
impossible  de  trouver  un modèle  unique de  développement  sur  ce  continent.  Les  écoles  des
variétés du capitalisme et de la régulation ont montré qu’il existe une variété de capitalismes
dans  les  pays  développés ;  cet  article  défend l’idée  que  nous  assistons  en  Amérique  latine  à
l’émergence de différents types de capitalisme. Dans au moins trois pays de ce continent nous
pouvons  observer  que  les  liens  de  complémentarité  entre  la  structure  économique  et  la
conformation socio-politique, l’insertion à l’économie mondiale, le rôle de l’Etat et le rapport
salarial (essentiellement le système de relations industrielles et le régime de protection sociale),
sont  suffisamment  forts  pour  pointer  vers  des  idéaux-types,  sans  toutefois  être  totalement
consolidés.
Aunque sin duda se podría haber hablado de América Latina en su conjunto durante el tiempo de
la ISI, hoy en día es imposible encontrar un modelo único de desarrollo en este continente. Las
escuelas de las variedades de capitalismo y de regulación han demostrado que hay una gran
variedad de capitalismos en los países desarrollados, en este artículo se defiende la idea de que en
América Latina también estamos asistiendo al desarrollo de diferentes tipos de capitalismo. En
por lo menos tres países de este continente hemos podido ver que la estructura económica y la
conformación  socio-política:  la  inserción  en  la  economía  mundial,  el  papel  del  Estado  y  la
relación  salarial  (rapport  salarial)  que  comprende  básicamente  el  sistema  de  relaciones
industriales  y  el  régimen  de  bienestar  son  lo  suficientemente  complementarios  como  para
apuntar hacia tipos ideales a pesar de que todavía no se han consolidado.
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